-
作者：Elsinger, Helmut; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp; Zulehner, Christine
作者单位：University of Vienna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form esti...
-
作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Georgiadis, George; Lambert, Nicolas S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We ...
-
作者：Callander, Steven; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：Innovation is often the key to sustained progress, yet innovation itself is difficult and highly risky. Success is not guaranteed as breakthroughs are mixed with, setbacks and the path of learning is typically far from smooth. How decision makers learn by trial and error and the efficacy of the process are inextricably linked to the incentives of the decision makers themselves and, in particular, to their tolerance for risk. In this paper; we develop a model of trial and error learning with ri...
-
作者：Romero, Julian; Rosokha, Yaroslav
作者单位：University of Arizona; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We study the evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when it is costly for players to adjust their strategy. Our experimental interface allows subjects to design a comprehensive strategy that then selects actions for them in every period. We conduct lab experiments in which subjects can adjust their strategies during a repeated game but may incur a cost for doing so. We find three main results. First, subjects learn to cooperate more when adjustments are costle...
-
作者：Loertscher, Simon; Riordan, Michael H.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Columbia University
摘要：Globalization reshaped supply chains and the boundaries of firms in favor of outsourcing. Now, even vertically integrated firms procure substantially from external suppliers. to study procurement and the structure of firms in this reshaped economy, we analyze a model in which integration grants a downstream customer the option to source internally Integration is advantageous because it allows the customer to avoid paying markups sometimes, hut disadvantageous because it discourages investments...
-
作者：Aoyagi, Masaki; Bhaskar, V.; Frechette, Guillaume R.
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; New York University
摘要：This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the th...
-
作者：Cerulli-Harms, Annette; Goette, Lorenz; Sprenger, Charles
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of London Courtauld Institute of Art; University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We test expectations-based reference dependence in market experiments with probabilistic forced exchange. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) predict that when the probability of forced exchange increases, individuals cannot expect to stick with the status quo, and should grow more willing to exchange. This mechanism may eliminate and even reverse the endowment effect (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Kohneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In a series of experiments with overall 930 subjects, we show some tentativ...
-
作者：Adams, Brian; Williams, Kevin R.
作者单位：United States Department of Labor; Yale University
摘要：We quantify the welfare effects of zone pricing, or setting common prices across distinct markets, in retail oligopoly. Although monopolists can only increase profits by price discriminating, this need not be true when firms face competition. With novel data covering the retail home-improvement industry, we find that Home Depot would benefit from, finer pricing hut that Lowe's would prefer coarser pricing, Zone pricing softens competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumer...
-
作者：Andonie, Costel; Diermeier, Daniel
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago; University of Chicago; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：We propose a model of impressionable voters. Impressionable voters vote based on impressions rather than maximizing expected utility. We apply our model to elections with multiple candidates and solve for the stationary distributions of the implied stochastic process. In elections with two candidates, we find that impressionable voters select the candidate that maximizes utilitarian welfare. In multi candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able ...
-
作者：Chen, Zhijun; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：Monash University; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper compares exclusive dealing and market share contracts in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss how the contracts work and identify a fundamental trade-off that arises: market share contracts are better at maximizing a seller's benefit from foreclosure (because they allow the seller to obtain any foreclosure level it desires), whereas exclusive-dealing contracts are better at minimizing a seller's cost of foreclosure (because, unlike with market share contracts, the seller does not ...
