Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bowen, T. Renee; Georgiadis, George; Lambert, Nicolas S.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Northwestern University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170217
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 243-298
• 关键词: authority; projects

摘要

Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over the project scale. From a welfare perspective, it may he desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.