The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Romero, Julian; Rosokha, Yaroslav
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160220
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 299-328
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; SHADOW; trust

摘要

We study the evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when it is costly for players to adjust their strategy. Our experimental interface allows subjects to design a comprehensive strategy that then selects actions for them in every period. We conduct lab experiments in which subjects can adjust their strategies during a repeated game but may incur a cost for doing so. We find three main results. First, subjects learn to cooperate more when adjustments are costless than when they are costly. Second, subjects make more adjustments to their strategies when adjustments are costless, but they still make adjustments even when they are costly. Finally, we find that cooperative strategies emerge over time when adjustments are costless hut not when adjustments are costly. These results highlight that within-game experimentation is critical to the rise of cooperative behavior We provide simulations based on an evolutionary algorithm to support these results.