Competition in Treasury Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Elsinger, Helmut; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp; Zulehner, Christine
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 157-184
• 关键词: divisible good auctions

摘要

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.