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作者：Hubbard, Thomas N.; Mazzeo, Michael J.
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton's (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s-1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particula...
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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We develop a framework for analyzing multidimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (i) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (ii) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. A multidimensional equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not w...
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作者：Elsinger, Helmut; Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp; Zulehner, Christine
作者单位：University of Vienna; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form esti...
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作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Georgiadis, George; Lambert, Nicolas S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We ...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Matouschek, Niko
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：Innovation is often the key to sustained progress, yet innovation itself is difficult and highly risky. Success is not guaranteed as breakthroughs are mixed with, setbacks and the path of learning is typically far from smooth. How decision makers learn by trial and error and the efficacy of the process are inextricably linked to the incentives of the decision makers themselves and, in particular, to their tolerance for risk. In this paper; we develop a model of trial and error learning with ri...
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作者：Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University; Dalhousie University
摘要：In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in ...
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作者：Romero, Julian; Rosokha, Yaroslav
作者单位：University of Arizona; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We study the evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when it is costly for players to adjust their strategy. Our experimental interface allows subjects to design a comprehensive strategy that then selects actions for them in every period. We conduct lab experiments in which subjects can adjust their strategies during a repeated game but may incur a cost for doing so. We find three main results. First, subjects learn to cooperate more when adjustments are costle...
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作者：Taneva, Ina
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state. Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs as well as those of the designer. We show how to derive the (designer) optimal information structure in static finite environments. We fully characterize it in a symmetric binary setting for a parameterized game. In this environment, conditionally independent private signals are never strictly optimal.
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作者：Chen, Cheng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Several classes of models of hierarchical organizations share two common properties: the characteristics at different levels of the hierarchy are complementary, but this complementarity does not extend beyond adjacent levels. We propose a unified yet simple approach to study comparative statics of organizational characteristics with endogenous number of hierarchical layers in all these models. We use this new approach to study organizational decision making, and show that increased delay cost ...
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作者：Luco, Fernando
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：How does online price disclosure affect competition when both consumers and firms can use the disclosed information? This paper addresses this question exploiting the sequential implementation of an online price-disclosure policy in the Chilean retail gasoline industry. The results show that disclosure increased margins by 9 percent on average, though the effects varied across the country depending on the intensity of local search behavior. Because margins increased the least, and even decreas...
