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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We develop a framework for analyzing multidimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (i) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (ii) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. A multidimensional equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not w...
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作者：Kaplan, Greg; Menzio, Guido; Rudanko, Leena; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University; Aarhus University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：Relative price dispersion refers to persistent differences in the price that different retailers set for one particular good relative to the price they set for other goods. Relative price dispersion accounts for 30 percent of the overall variance of prices at which the same good is sold during the same week and in the same market. Relative price dispersion can be rationalized as the consequence of a pricing strategy used by sellers to discriminate between high-valuation buyers who need to make...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Coercion is used by one government (the sender) to influence the trade practices of another (the target). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a weak international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the internationa...
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作者：Angelucci, Charles; Cage, Julia
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We model the consequences on newspapers' content and prices of a reduction in advertising revenues. Newspapers choose the size of their newsroom, and readers are heterogeneous in their ideal amount of journalistic-intensive content. We show that a reduction in advertising revenues lowers newspapers' incentives to produce journalistic-intensive content. We also build a unique dataset on French newspapers between 1960 and 1974 and perform a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the intro...
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作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the uni...
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作者：Chung, Hui-Kuan; Glimcher, Paul; Tymula, Agnieszka
作者单位：New York University; New York University; University of Sydney
摘要：Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave utility over gains and convex utility over losses; a pattern widely seen in lottery tasks. Although such discontinuous gain-loss reference-dependence is also used to model riskless choices, only limited empirical evidence supports this use. In incentive-compatible experiments, we find that gain-loss reflection effects are not observed under riskless choice as predicted by prospect theory, even whi...
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作者：Haeringer, Guillaume; Iehle, Vincent
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Universite de Rouen Normandie
摘要：In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 perce...
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作者：Cheng, Chen; Li, Christopher
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Yale University
摘要：We develop a model of policy experimentation in which the policy decisions of local and national politicians are driven by career concerns. When politicians' payoffs are convex in their reputation and policymaking is opaque, local politicians experiment by introducing more diverse policies than national politicians do. The welfare implications of decentralization depend on homogeneity between districts. In particular, learning about policies is greater under decentralization if and only if the...
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作者：Hurkens, Sjaak; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms' profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm's market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival's profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a c...
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作者：Reimers, Imke
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：Taking works off copyright promotes their availability, but it also allows generic entry to dissipate producer surplus. This paper examines the effect of a copyright on the availability and price of books when incentives to create new works are not affected. Evaluating the welfare impact of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, I find that a copyright significantly limits the availability of works, leading to a decrease in consumer surplus, which is significantly larger than any increases in ...
