Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haeringer, Guillaume; Iehle, Vincent
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Universite de Rouen Normandie
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 155-190
• 关键词: college admissions problem; allocation; residents

摘要

In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market.