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作者：Gersbach, Hans
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a score-replication rule. Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that a...
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作者：Kendall, Chad
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：In a market rush., the fear of future adverse price movements causes traders to trade before they become well informed, reducing the informational efficiency of the market. I derive theoretical conditions under which market rushes are equilibrium behavior and study how well these conditions organize trading behavior in a laboratory implementation of the model. Market rushes, including both panics and frenzies, occur more frequently when predicted by theory. However, subjects use commonly discu...
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作者：Mass, Helene; Fugger, Nicolas; Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：Procurement regulation. aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule-imitation perfection-that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every equilibrium, bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same valuation earn the same expected utility. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surpl...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Jagadeesan, Ravi; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in their setting, full substitutability is equivalent to the assumption that all indirect utility representations of each firm's preferences are quasisubmodular; we show here that this claimed equivalence result does not hold in gener...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We steady the practice of influencer marketing in oligopoly markets and its effect on market efficiency. In our model, each consumer is influenced by choices of a subset of other consumers. Firms gather information on consumers' influence and price discriminate using this information. In equilibrium, firms charge premial subsidize below-/above-average-influential consumers; the premial discounts depend on the strength of network effects and on how much information firms have on consumers' infl...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Benabou, Roland
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
摘要：We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster desirable behaviors. Each, agent acts based on his intrinsic motivation, private assessment of the public good, and reputational concern for appearing prosocial. A Principal sets the general degree of privacy, observes the social outcome, and implements a policy: investment, subsidy, law, etc. Individual visibility reduces free riding but makes aggregate behavior (descriptive norm) less informative about societal preferences (pr...
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作者：Henry, Emeric; Louis-Sidois, Charles
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus ...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram; Surana, Khushboo
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; KU Leuven; University of York - UK
摘要：We present a revealed preference methodology for nonparametric demand analysis under the assumption of normal goods. Our methodology is flexible in that it allows for imposing normality on any subset of goods. We show the usefulness of our methodology for empirical welfare analysis through cost-of-living indices. An illustration to US consumption data drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) demonstrates that mild normality assumptions can substantially strengthen the empirical ana...
