History-Bound Reelections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gersbach, Hans
• 署名单位: Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170102
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 33-75
• 关键词: social sub-optimality; ELECTIONS; COMPETITION; incumbency

摘要

We introduce history-bound reelections. In their simple form, they consist in a score-replication rule. Under such a rule, an incumbent has to match the highest vote share he or she has obtained in any previous election in order to be reelected. We develop a simple three-period model to examine score-replication rules. We show that suitable variants of such rules can improve welfare, as they reduce the tendency of reelected incumbents to indulge in their own preferences, and they ensure that able officeholders are reelected. Candidates might offer their own score-replication rule in campaigns. We outline how political competition may be affected by such new forms of elections.