Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Jagadeesan, Ravi; Kominers, Scott Duke
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190204
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 277-285
• 关键词: stability; equilibrium

摘要

Hatfield and Kominers (2012) introduced a model of matching in networks with bilateral contracts and showed that stable outcomes exist in supply chains when firms' preferences over contracts are fully substitutable. Hatfield and Kominers (2012) also asserted that in their setting, full substitutability is equivalent to the assumption that all indirect utility representations of each firm's preferences are quasisubmodular; we show here that this claimed equivalence result does not hold in general. We show instead that full substitutability is equivalent to weak quasisubmodularity of all indirect utility representations.