Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, S. Nageeb; Benabou, Roland
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180052
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 116-164
• 关键词: Social pressure; large numbers; aggregation; TRANSPARENCY; LAW; committees; ECONOMICS; RIGHTS; MODEL

摘要

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster desirable behaviors. Each, agent acts based on his intrinsic motivation, private assessment of the public good, and reputational concern for appearing prosocial. A Principal sets the general degree of privacy, observes the social outcome, and implements a policy: investment, subsidy, law, etc. Individual visibility reduces free riding but makes aggregate behavior (descriptive norm) less informative about societal preferences (prescriptive norm). We derive the level of privacy (and material incentives) that optimally trades off social enforcement and learning, and we characterize its variations with. the economy's stochastic and informational structure.