Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Henry, Emeric; Louis-Sidois, Charles
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180299
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 246-276
• 关键词: Information aggregation; committees; PARTICIPATION; SANCTIONS; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus of reputation and the voting decisions, and can be welfare decreasing as it makes some rules more likely to be rejected.