Imitation Perfection-A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mass, Helene; Fugger, Nicolas; Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160250
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 189-245
• 关键词: Mechanism design; CORRUPTION; auctions; COMPETITION

摘要

Procurement regulation. aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule-imitation perfection-that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every equilibrium, bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same valuation earn the same expected utility. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surplus optimal auctions consistent with imitation perfection exist. For heterogeneous bidders, however, it is incompatible with revenue and social surplus optimization. Thus, a trade-off between non-discrimination and optimality exists.