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作者：Dessein, Wouter; Santos, Tano
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result in dramatically different firm behavior, as managers devote scarce attention in a way that amplifies ...
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作者：Hestermann, Nina; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：University of St Andrews; University of Munich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study an experimentation problem in a situation where the outcomes depend on the decision-maker's intrinsic ability and on an external variable. We analyze the mistakes made by individuals who hold inaccurate prior beliefs about their ability. Overconfident individuals take too much credit for their successes and excessively blame external factors if they fail. They are too easily dissatisfied with their environment, which leads them to experiment in variable environments and revise their s...
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作者：Lach, Saul; Neeman, Zvika; Schankerman, Mark
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tel Aviv University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-finan...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Bowen, T. Renee
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experime...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Product recall data and information on stock price reactions to recalls are used to estimate the value of reputation in a model in which product quality is not contractible. A recall is the result of a product defect that signals low effort. The recall triggers a reduction in the firm's product price and value, which then both rise steadily until its next defect occurs. We estimate that reputation accounts for 8.3 percent of firm value and that welfare is 26 percent of its first best level. A ...
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作者：Angrisani, Marco; Guarino, Antonio; Jehiel, Philippe; Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their beliefs about the value of a good after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision-making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the p...
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作者：Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
摘要：The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Ansco...
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作者：Tsur, Matan
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors a share of the revenues. The revenue of each project is determined ex post through bargaining with a buyer of the output. Thus, the choice of security affects the feasible payoffs of the bargaining game. We characterize the securities that achieve the firm's maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In a large class of sec...
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作者：Gaudin, Germain; White, Alexander
作者单位：University of Freiburg; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要：Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role that user access plays on prices, profits, and welfare under both forms of agreement. We characterize this role and show how it potentially overturns standard results saying that proportional fees lead to...
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作者：Jacobs, Joshua A.; Kolb, Aaron M.; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Duke University
摘要：We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member's output is an imperfect signal of his underlying effort, and each member's utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to other members' efforts. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two channels: expulsion following poor performance and respite following good performance. We derive the steady state distribution of members' continuation utilities for arbitrary values ...
