Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lorecchio, Caio; Monte, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Turin
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200356
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 359-398
• 关键词: Bounded memory; Bayesian persuasion; reputation

摘要

An information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data reg-ulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communica-tion constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recom-mendations) are the optimal design when experimentation is needed to generate information and approximate the designer's first-best payoff for specific feedback structures. When the designer has altruistic motives, constrained rules significantly decrease welfare.