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作者：Novak, Vladimir; Matveenko, Andrei; Ravaioli, Silvio
作者单位：National Bank of Slovakia; University of Mannheim; Cornerstone Research
摘要：We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex ante. We present how optimal information acquisition and subsequent belief formation depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically-in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world- update away from the realized truth, and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model's pr...
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作者：Amasino, Dianna R.; Pace, Davide D.; Van der Weele, Joel J.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Munich; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Attitudes toward fairness and redistribution differ along socioeconomic lines. To understand their formation, we conduct a large-scale experiment on attention to merit and luck and the effect of attention on fairness decisions. Randomly advantaged subjects pay less attention to information about true merit and retain more economic surplus, and this effect persists in subsequent impartial decisions. Attention also has a causal role: encouraging subjects to look at merit reduces the effect of an...
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作者：Fosgerau, Mogens; Monardo, Julien; De Palma, Andre
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Bristol; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We introduce the inverse product differentiation logit ( IPDL ) model, a micro-founded inverse market share model for differentiated products that captures market segmentation according to one or more characteristics. The IPDL model generalizes the nested logit model to allow richer substitution patterns, including complementarity in demand, and can be estimated by linear instrumental variable regression with market-level data. Furthermore, we provide Monte Carlo experiments comparing the IPDL...
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作者：Guo, Liang
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We revisit the interpretation of the anchoring effect as evidence for nonexisting or arbitrary preferences. A theory of endogenous information acquisition ( i.e. , deliberation) is developed to rationalize the causal dependence of economic valuations on arbitrary anchor numbers. We identify theory-driven moderators to reconcile seemingly discrepant findings among original and follow-up anchoring experiments. We demonstrate in a meta-analysis that the anchoring effect may be systematically mode...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Fershtman, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Emory University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We consider a decision-maker sequentially choosing among alternatives when periodic payoffs depend on both chosen and unchosen alternatives in that period. We show that when flow payoffs are the sum or product of payoffs from chosen and unchosen alternatives, the optimal policy is an index policy. We characterize key properties of the optimal dynamics and present an algorithm for computing the indices explicitly. Furthermore, we use the results to generalize Weitzman's ( 1979 ) classic Pandora...
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作者：He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe; Zhu, Xun
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon; Michigan State University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal split is in the core and whether efficient matching is assortative; the canonical cooperative theory predicts no effect. In markets with an equal number of participants on both sides, individual payoffs cannot be explained by existing refinements of the core, but are consistent with our noncooperative model's predictions. ...
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作者：Apffelstaedt, Arno; Freundt, Jana
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magni...
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作者：Lipsitz, Michael; Tremblay, Mark j.
作者单位：Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Las Vegas
摘要：Employee spin-offs harm incumbent firms by increasing competition ( benefiting consumers) and preventing firm owners from making beneficial investments in workers who may later spin off ( harming consumers). We model noncompete agreements ( NCAs ) as solutions for the firm and analyze the resulting trade-off for consumers. We show that market structure and the nature of investment play large roles. Counterintuitively, increased investment benefits have the potential to harm consumers such that...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Eraslan, Hulya; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majority rule. Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules. We also find large point prediction devi...
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作者：Barrios, John m.; Wollmann, Thomas g.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anticompetitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method f...
