Consistent Depth of Reasoning in Level-k Models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique; Morales, Antonio J.; Qi, Shi
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; University of East Anglia; European University of Madrid; Universidad de Malaga; William & Mary
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210237
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 40-76
• 关键词: guessing games; winners curse; BEHAVIOR; beliefs; play; equilibrium; cognition; auctions

摘要

Level-k models often assume that individuals employ a fixed depth of reasoning across different games. We study this assumption by having subjects make choices in five classes of games chosen to identify inconsistent depth of reasoning. We demonstrate that depth of reasoning is pervasively inconsistent, changing both within and between classes of games. We show that this cannot easily be explained by factors such as subject confusion, changing beliefs about others' depth of reasoning, stochastic choice, model misspecification, changing incentives, or low cognitive ability. We develop a simple model incorporating ambiguity aversion that predicts inconsistent depth of reasoning.