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作者：Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Mcclure, Jonathon; Sorensen, Alan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Purdue University System; Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a method to augment conventional demand estimation approaches with crowd-sourced data on the product space. Our method obtains triplets data (product A is closer to B than it is to C) from an online survey to compute an embedding-i.e., a low-dimensional representation of the latent product space. The embedding can either replace data on observed characteristics in mixed logit models, or provide pairwise product distances to discipline cross-elasticities in log-linear models. We illu...
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作者：Chaves, Daniel; Duarte, Marco
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We study the inner workings of a hub-and-spoke cartel in the Brazilian automotive fuel industry. Based on court documents and detailed price and sales data, we discuss how gas station owners (spokes) operating inside the federal capital received help from fuel distributors (hub) to reduce dispersion of and increase gasoline's retail price. We provide evidence that distributor cartel members benefited by raising wholesale prices while keeping competitors from supplying retail cartel members. We...
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作者：Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) un...
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作者：Belot, Michele; Kircher, Philipp; Muller, Paul
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Edinburgh; Universite Catholique Louvain; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We propose a simple method for eliciting individual time preferences without estimating utility functions even in settings where background consumption changes over time. It relies on eliciting preferences for receiving high stakes lottery tickets at different points in time. In a standard intertemporal choice model high rewards decouple lottery choices from variation in background consumption. We investigate robustness to other assumptions theoretically, and validate our elicitation method ex...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
摘要：Coordination games feature two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. We investigate learning dynamics where agents observe the actions of a random sample of their opponents. First, we show that when all agents have the same sample size, whether it is small or large, their behavior converges to one of the pure coordinated equilibria. By contrast, our main results show ...
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作者：Schmidt, Patrick
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Preferences for mixing can reveal ambiguity perception and attitude on a single event. The validity of the approach is discussed for multiple preference classes, including maxmin, maxmax, variational, and smooth second-order preferences. An experimental implementation suggests that participants perceive almost as much ambiguity for the stock index and actions of other participants as they do for the Ellsberg urn, indicating the importance of ambiguity in real-world decision-making. (JEL C72, D...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Wong, Russell; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the incentive role of severance compensation. In a canonical principal-agent model, we introduce exogenous job destruction risk and show that compensation following job destruction can reduce overall incentive costs. To mitigate the risk of inefficient endogenous termination, agents with low continuation value receive no severance and lose value at job destruction, while agents with high continuation value receive high severance and gain value at job destruction. Comparative statics o...
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作者：Shirakawa, Ryo
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain simple misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010...
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作者：Alviarez, Vanessa; Head, Keith; Mayer, Thierry
作者单位：Inter-American Development Bank; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); European Central Bank; Bank of France; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Large beer and spirits makers expanded abroad mainly by acquiring local brands. Exploiting market share data in 76 countries and changes in brand ownership from 2007 to 2018, we estimate that owners matter little for brand performance, except via a negative consumer response to foreign ownership. Counterfactuals indicate that market power increases were large enough to yield higher profits for most mergers without relying on fixed-cost savings. Emulating procompetition policies used by the Uni...
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作者：Horn, Samantha; Loewenstein, George
作者单位：University of Chicago; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Many economic decisions, such as whether to invest in developing new skills, change professions, or purchase a technology, benefit from accurate estimation of skill acquisition. We examine the accuracy of such predictions by having study participants predict the speed at which they will master unfamiliar tasks. Across three studies involving two types of tasks and two levels of difficulty, we find systematic underestimation of learning, even after receiving feedback. In a fourth study, partici...
