-
作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dong, Miaomiao; Hoshino, Tetsuya
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We consider an ultimatum game where the value of the object being sold to the buyer is high or low. The seller knows the value, but the buyer does not. The value to the seller is zero. We introduce the option for the buyer to acquire costly information after an offer is made. This information either confirms the high value or provides no information. As the cost of information vanishes, the buyer gets all the surplus in a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, although the option to acqui...
-
作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study pivots as signaling devices in a dynamic experimentation model. An entrepreneur receives funding from an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation to succeed. The entrepreneur has a real option to pivot, i.e., to abandon the project and to start a new one. Investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur's pivoting decisions. We characterize signaling equilibria in which high-skill e...
-
作者：Ball, Ian
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers higher decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so tha...
