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作者：Mimra, Wanda; Waibel, Christian
作者单位：heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
摘要：This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the role of contracting environments on market outcomes and efficiency in markets with hidden information using experimental methods. When markets are plagued by hidden information, competition does not necessarily ensure efficient market outcomes. This crucially depends on the nature of the hidden information. We present a parsimonious experimental design that serves to compare the different contracting environments for both types of hidden...
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作者：Vives, Xavier; Vravosinos, Orestis
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University
摘要：We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases-and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread-an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm welfare by softening product market competition, reducing entry, and thereby (in contrast to standard results) inducing insufficient entry and magnifying the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. Overlapping ownersh...
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作者：Mackay, Alexander; Miller, Nathan h.
作者单位：University of Virginia; Georgetown University
摘要：We consider the identification of empirical models of supply and demand with imperfect competition. We show that a restriction on the covariance between unobserved demand and cost shocks can resolve endogeneity and identify the price parameter. We demonstrate how to employ this approach in estimation, and we compare it to the method of instrumental variables. Our formal results also indicate that weaker covariance restrictions can bound the price parameter. We illustrate the covariance restric...
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作者：Vong, Allen
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：A firm trades with a sequence of consumers who are unsure about the firm's competence and its effort to supply quality. I examine rating systems that sustain efficient outcomes in virtually all trades by providing consumers with information to motivate a patient-competent firm's effort. I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for these systems to exist. I show that any such system censors the firm's track records, and explicitly construct one such system. This system reveals that th...
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作者：Rachidi, Tobias
作者单位：Fraunhofer Gesellschaft; Fraunhofer Germany; Fraunhofer Applied Information Technology
摘要：This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide range of economically relevant domains, and it is much larger than the well-known single-peaked preferences on a line. I characterize the welfare-maximizing voting rules among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：This paper studies monitoring in long-term, self-enforcing relationships with adverse selection and moral hazard. Monitoring is used to screen low types by incentivizing them to shirk. Once high types have been identified, monitoring is used both to incentivize effort from high types and to provide off-path (dis)incentives for low types looking to build a reputation. This results in a key trade-off: providing cost-efficient incentives to high types, versus screening low types faster. The optim...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-cohen, Inbal; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study information aggregation with a decision-maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information about a hidden state. While the decision-maker knows the prior distribution over states and the marginal distribution of each agent's recommendation, the recommendations are adversarially correlated. The decision-maker's goal is choosing a robustly optimal aggregation rule. We prove that for a large number of agents for ...
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作者：Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Osaka
摘要：We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a na & iuml;ve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's private information and the offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the seller's profits or trade surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is, all types of buyers trade. We then provide conditi...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Gu, Jiadong; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Zhejiang University
摘要：We consider the equilibrium interplay between sellers' price competition and consumers' perception of product differentiation. We analyze a situation where, before trading, consumers acquire information at a cost about their preferences between sellers' differentiated products. The incentive for information acquisition depends on the average value of products, the objective product differentiation, and their beliefs about sellers' prices. The acquired information shapes consumers' perceived pr...
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作者：Caradonna, Peter; Miller, Nathan h.; Sheu, Gloria
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We model merger-induced entry in the context of differentiated-products price competition. We fully characterize the combinations of merger efficiencies and entrant qualities that can mitigate the adverse equilibrium welfare effects of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The possibility of merger-induced entry introduces nonmonotonicity into the equilibrium value that consumers receive from merger efficiencies, potentially necessitating the joint analysis of efficiencies and entry in merger r...
