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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study pivots as signaling devices in a dynamic experimentation model. An entrepreneur receives funding from an investor and has private information about a project, which requires costly experimentation to succeed. The entrepreneur has a real option to pivot, i.e., to abandon the project and to start a new one. Investors learn about the project from the arrival of exogenous information and from the entrepreneur's pivoting decisions. We characterize signaling equilibria in which high-skill e...
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作者：Ball, Ian
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The sender prefers higher decisions, and she can distort each feature at a privately known cost. I characterize the scoring rule that maximizes decision accuracy. This rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights other features so tha...
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作者：Reshidi, Pellumb; Thereze, Joao; Zhang, Mu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Duke University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study asymptotic learning when the decision-maker faces ambiguity in the precision of her information sources. She aims to estimate a state and evaluates outcomes according to the worst-case scenario. Under prior-by-prior updating, we characterize the set of asymptotic posteriors the decision-maker entertains, which consists of a continuum of degenerate distributions over an interval. Moreover, her asymptotic estimate of the state is generically incorrect. We show that even a small amount o...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper studies dynamic incentive pay in teams where agents' efforts are perfect substitutes. It shows that the principal may unequally reward identical agents to mitigate dynamic free riding in the form of procrastination. Unequal pay effectively creates a team leader who overworks and symmetric followers who underwork. Such leader-follower teams emerge if (i) agents are relatively patient or few, or (ii) the principal sufficiently cares about or is not patient for project success. These f...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a...
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作者：Benabou, Roland; Vellodi, Nikhil
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are prosocially motivated (forward-looking). Disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). The extent of disclosure ...
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作者：Camboni, Matteo; Porcellacchia, Michael
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms'concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap. We find firms predominantly employ individual performance bonuses, ignoring that relevant information about team output and competition for better contracts leads workers into a self-defeating race toward effort transparency. Notably, the firm may be indifferent to or benefit from trust concerns,...
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作者：Decarolis, Francesco; Li, Muxin; Paternollo, Filippo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute for Mathematics & Interdisciplinary Sciences; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper offers the first systematic quantitative assessment of default-option interventions designed to mitigate Google's search dominance. By analyzing interventions in the European Economic Area (EEA), Russia, and Turkey, we find that across all three cases, changes to default settings effectively reduced Google's market share. The causal impact amounts to less than 1 percentage point in the EEA and over 10 percentage points in Russia and Turkey. Differences arise from intervention nuance...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim; Morgan, John
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We model decisions to apply for college admission, attend job auditions, or run for C-suite positions as costly entry into meritocracies, where the entrant with the highest ability wins a reward. Ability is privately known and players generically differ in commonly known characteristics such as ability distributions, entry costs, or payoffs from winning. Any infinitesimal difference leads to wildly different equilibrium entry probabilities, explaining large dispersion in representation of comp...
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作者：Correa, Sofia
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a veteran reward. Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which ...
