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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper studies dynamic incentive pay in teams where agents' efforts are perfect substitutes. It shows that the principal may unequally reward identical agents to mitigate dynamic free riding in the form of procrastination. Unequal pay effectively creates a team leader who overworks and symmetric followers who underwork. Such leader-follower teams emerge if (i) agents are relatively patient or few, or (ii) the principal sufficiently cares about or is not patient for project success. These f...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of information in Bertrand competition with differentiated goods and heterogeneous production costs. When producers know their costs and consumers know their values, consumer surplus and total surplus are aligned, in the sense that the information and equilibrium that maximize consumer surplus also maximize total surplus. Alignment may fail if consumers do not know their values: Partial information about values makes purchases less efficient but intensifies price competition....
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作者：Clark, Robert; Coviello, Decio; De Leverano, Adriano
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：Clustered bids and a missing mass of nearly tied bids have both been proposed as markers of collusion. We present causal empirical evidence from an actual procurement cartel that bidding involves both clustering and a gap around the winning bid. We support these results with information from the testimony of cartel participants that explains how both patterns arise naturally as part of an arrangement featuring complementary bidding. Based on these findings, we develop an easy-to-implement scre...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Imperial College London
摘要：We model competitive insurance markets with continuous cost-types. A regulator sets minimum and maximum coverage levels and a fee for nonbuyers. Equilibrium is unique if the type distribution is log-concave. Increasing the nonpurchase fee increases welfare if the density of types is decreasing. The optimal level of the minimum coverage is positive, is below full insurance, and induces some pooling at the minimum coverage contract. The optimal level of the maximum coverage is full insurance, ev...
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作者：Vohra, Akhil
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Exeter
摘要：Labor markets unravel when workers and firms match inefficiently early under limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the presence of a secondary market, where firms can poach workers, and its transparency: how well firms can ascertain workers' value once they are employed by competitors. While early hiring reduces the probability of hiring a high-type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. When secondary market...
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作者：Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Seonghoon; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Singapore Management University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We conduct a large-scale experiment to measure elementary aspects of strategic thinking skills and their linkage to labor market outcomes. Two incentivized measures of higher-order rationality and backward induction are developed. Males' (females') strategic thinking skills are positively (negatively) associated with individual labor income. However, among married individuals, strategic thinking skills are significantly and positively associated with their household labor income regardless of ...
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作者：Ganapati, Sharat
作者单位：Georgetown University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Half of all transactions in the $6 trillion market for manufactured goods in the United States were intermediated by wholesalers in 2012, up from 32 percent in 1992. Seventy percent of this increase is due to the growth of superstar firms-the largest 1 percent. Estimates based on detailed administrative data show that the rise of the largest firms was driven by an intuitive linkage between their sourcing of goods from abroad and an expansion of their domestic distribution network to reach more...
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作者：Pancs, Romans; Sharma, Tridib
作者单位：University of Rochester; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man, one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the policy, and under the political view, according to which voters care about representation. Both justifications assume that the districter is partisan. If the districter is benevolent, one man, one vote is harmless under the economic view but may ...
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Kerzenmacher, Florian; Schumacher, Heiner; Verboven, Frank
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Innsbruck; KU Leuven
摘要：Empirical search cost estimates are often large and increasing in the size of the transaction. We conduct an online search experiment in which we manipulate the price scale while keeping the physical search effort per price quote constant. Additionally, we obtain a direct measure of subjects' opportunity costs of time. Using a standard search model, we confirm that search cost estimates are large and increasing in the price scale. We then modify the model to incorporate context effects with re...
