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作者：Lerner, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Open University Israel
摘要：This paper deals with a pie allocation problem to users, who are divided into sharing groups, that are not necessarily disjoint. The pie is allocated among the groups, rather than the users. The portion of a sharing group is a public good for its members, that is, all of them can enjoy it. A non-cooperative game for allocating the pie and a special equilibrium outcome, strongly disappointment-free allocation, are defined. We prove the existence of a unique such allocation and show that it coin...
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作者：Ruffle, BJ
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：This paper examines Allocators' willingness to reward and punish their paired Recipients. Recipients only compete in a skill-testing contest, the outcome of which determines the size of the surplus. In the dictator game, Allocators reward skillful Recipients, but punish unskillful ones only modestly. The punishment effect is mitigated by the belief held by some Allocators that effort is the appropriate measure of deservingness. The ultimatum game extension reveals offerers' ability to adapt to...
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作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles such that (1) players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts and (2) forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning process involving (vanishing) trembles. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Chatterjee, K; Lee, CC
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is wors...
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作者：Laussel, D; Le Breton, M
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：A private, profit-maximizing firm produces a public good that enters the utility functions of several users. Each of them separately designs and proposes to the firm a contract specifying a transfer payment as a function of the amount of public good supplied. The firm has to accept or to refuse each contract before knowing the realized value of a random variable that enters its cost function. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and explore some refinements ruling out Pareto inefficient e...
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作者：Segendorff, B
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Two principals (nations) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on th...
