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作者：Costa-Gomes, M; Zauner, KG
作者单位：University of York - UK; Harvard University; University of Vienna
摘要：We explain the main Features of the results of the four-country ultimatum bargaining experiments of Roth et al. (1991), Amer. Econom. Rev. 81, 1068-1095) by a social utility model. The specification of social utility of a player has two parts: a linear combination of the monetary payoffs of the proposer and the responder and payoff uncertainty. We find that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries. Proposers have negative regard fur responders' mone...
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作者：Calvo, E; Santos, JC
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Basque Country
摘要：We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems that involve two types of heterogeneous outputs, divisible and indivisible. The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Anderson, SP; Goerce, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome for 2 x 2 games. In accordance with experimental evidence, logit equilibrium efforts dec...
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作者：Laslier, JF; Topol, R; Walliser, B
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper studies the cumulative proportional reinforcement (CPR) rule, according to which an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability proportional to the cumulative utility that the agent has obtained with that action. The asymptotic properties of this learning process are examined for a decision-maker under risk, where it converges almost surely toward the expected utility maximizing action(s). The process is further considered in a two-player game; it converges with positi...
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作者：Saari, DG; Sieberg, KK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine; William & Mary
摘要：While it is troubling when power-index values change with the index, the problem is more severe: Different indices can generate radically different rankings. For example, a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players. In contrast, with a fixed number of players certain indices always share the same ranking: e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but they can have opposite rankings with more players. It is explained why ind...
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作者：Biswas, AK; Parthasarathy, T; Ravindran, G
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Bangalore; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper, we show that the extendability condition introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986, Core Stability in n-Person Games, Mimeo) is sufficient for the core to be stable as well as large, for TU games with five or fewer players. We provide a counter example when the number of players is six. We then introduce a stronger extendability condition and show that it is necessary and sufficient for the core t...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
摘要：Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93-101) showed that no mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game. Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1-23) purification argument implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict, and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed payoffs. This paper reconciles these results: Approximations of mixed equilibria have high invasion...
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作者：Bosch-Domènech, A; Sáez-Martí, M
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower-tender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of a...
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作者：Izquierdo, JM; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (TU.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set A la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set a la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
