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作者：Wurman, PR; Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction se...
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作者：Parkes, DC; Huberman, BA
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. A system of cooperative agents divide initial wealth and follow individual worst-case optimal investment strategies from random portfolios, sharing their final profits and losses. The multiagent system achieves better average-case performance than a single agent with the same initial wealth in a simple stochastic market. A further increase in performance is achieved through communication of hints between agents ...
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作者：Sandholm, TW; Lesser, VR
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：In (automated) negotiation systems for self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. They do not accommodate future events. Contingency contracts address this, but are often impractical. As an alternative, we propose leveled commitment contracts. The level of commitment is set by breach penalties. To be freed from the contract, an agent simply pays the penalty to the other party. A self-interested agent will be reluctant to breach because the other party might breach, in w...
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作者：Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M; Varian, H
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
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作者：Greenwald, A; Friedman, EJ; Shenker, S
作者单位：Brown University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper describes the results of simulation experiments performed on a suits of learning algorithms. We focus on games in network contexts. These are contexts in which (1) agents have very limited information about the game and (2) play can be extremely asynchronous. There are many proposed learning algorithms in the literature. We choose a small sampling of such algorithms and use numerical simulation to explore the nature of asymptotic play. In particular, we explore the extent to which t...
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作者：Nisan, N; Ronen, A
作者单位：Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concer...
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作者：Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE; Wurman, PR; MacKie-Mason, JK
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; North Carolina State University
摘要：Decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time, where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules. We investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, the quality of equilibrium solutions, and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol. To remedy the potential ...
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作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine a version of Rubinstein's Electronic Mail Game in which the noisy communications technology is voluntary and costly. Multiple Nash equilibria exist, including an equilibrium in which messages are ignored, and an equilibrium in which only one message is sent, revealing the state of nature and allowing coordination on the relevant action whenever this message arrives. The equilibrium in which messages are ignored is eliminated by an appropriate evolutionary stability condition. The re...
