A parametrization of the auction design space
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Wurman, PR; Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE
署名单位：
North Carolina State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2000.0828
发表日期：
2001
页码：
304-338
关键词：
摘要：
We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction servers. It also facilitates the communication of auction rules to software agents, enabling the automation of flexible market-based negotiation. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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