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作者：Mattsson, LG; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Boston University; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：We derive a family of probabilistic choice models, including the multinomial logit model, from a microecononic model in which the decision maker has to make some effort in order to implement any desired outcome. The disutility of this effort enters the decision maker's goal function in an additively separable way. A particular disutility function, yielding the multinomial logit as a special case, is characterized axiamatically. The present approach naturally leads to a normalization of the ach...
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作者：Morgan, J; Sefton, M
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; University of Nottingham
摘要：We investigate behavior in two unprofitable games-where Maxmin strategies do not form a Nash equilibrium yet guarantee the same payoff as Nash equilibrium strategies-that vary in the riskiness of the Nash strategy. We find that arguments for the implausibility of Nash equilibrium are confirmed by our experiments; however, claims that this will lead to Maxmin play are not. Neither solution concept accounts for more than 53% of choices in either game. The results indicate that the tension betwee...
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作者：Duffy, J; Feltovich, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper reports results from an experiment designed to compare cheap talk and observation of past actions. We consider three games and explain why cheap talk or observation is likely to be more effective for achieving good outcomes in each game. We find that both cheap talk and observation make cooperation and coordination more likely and increase payoffs, relative to our control treatment. The relative success of cheap talk versus observation depends on the game, in accordance with our pre...
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作者：Greenberg, J; Luo, X; Oladi, R; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：McGill University; National Taiwan University; University System of Ohio; University of Dayton; University of Haifa
摘要：Within the framework of (pure) exchange economies, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space. Following Harsanyi (1974. Management Sci. 20, 1472-1495). we then define the notion of the sophisticated stable set and establish an equivalence theorem: like the core, the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space coincides with that in the utility space. We also show that the sophisticated sta...
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作者：Ryan, MJ
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：Belief persistence is a standard rationality axiom in formal models of belief change. It requires that new information be accommodated with the smallest possible change to existing beliefs. This note shows that violations of belief persistence are possible in J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey's (1999a, Signalling Games with Uncertainty, unpublished. University of Birmingham; 1999b, in Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Waking (M. J. Machina and B. Munier, Eds.), pp. 135-157, Dordrecht...
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作者：Juang, WT
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：This paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. Two rules arc investigated; the myopic best response and naive imitation. If agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules. When agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the...
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作者：Cooper, DJ; Stockman, CK
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Over the last twenty years, experimental economists have identified a wide variety of games in which subjects display other-regarding behavior in violation of standard game theoretic predictions. The two primary approaches to explaining this behavior can be characterized as the fairness hypothesis and the learning hypothesis. Both hypotheses provide an adequate explanation of behavior in existing experiments, but the two approaches rely on very different interpretations of the factors underlyi...
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作者：Andreoni, J; Brown, PM; Vesterlund, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Auckland; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We explore three two-person public goods games with similar equilibrium predictions, but with different rules of the game, different payoff possibilities, and, as we show, different choices by subjects. Comparisons among games allow inferences of what may or may not determine when the equilibrium prediction is a good approximation of actual behavior. We find that the equilibrium prediction can fail even when incentives off the equilibrium enforce it. Our result suggests that the selfish predic...
