(Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Greenberg, J; Luo, X; Oladi, R; Shitovitz, B
署名单位：
McGill University; National Taiwan University; University System of Ohio; University of Dayton; University of Haifa
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0890
发表日期：
2002
页码：
54-70
关键词：
摘要：
Within the framework of (pure) exchange economies, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space. Following Harsanyi (1974. Management Sci. 20, 1472-1495). we then define the notion of the sophisticated stable set and establish an equivalence theorem: like the core, the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space coincides with that in the utility space. We also show that the sophisticated stable set has the desirable property of individual rationality. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).