Violations of belief persistence in Dempster-Shafer equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ryan, MJ
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0880
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 167-174
• 关键词: Dempster-Shafer equilibrium; Dempster-Shafer rule; Choquet expected utility; signaling games; belief persistence

摘要

Belief persistence is a standard rationality axiom in formal models of belief change. It requires that new information be accommodated with the smallest possible change to existing beliefs. This note shows that violations of belief persistence are possible in J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey's (1999a, Signalling Games with Uncertainty, unpublished. University of Birmingham; 1999b, in Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Waking (M. J. Machina and B. Munier, Eds.), pp. 135-157, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic) Dempster-Shafer equilibrium (DSE), a solution concept for signaling games based on Choquet expected utility. Such violations may lead to implausible equilibria, so a refinement of DSE is proposed. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).