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作者：Renault, J; Scarlatti, S; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of Turin; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name minority game). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equil...
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作者：Takahashi, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster...
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作者：Smith, K; Dickhaut, J
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Linkoping University
摘要：In two different types of institutions, English and Dutch auctions, we collect heart rate data, a proxy for emotion, to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior. We first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions. Next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant's emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic v...
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作者：Bhatt, M; Camerer, CF
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in theory of mind and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices an...
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作者：Ellingsen, T; Johannesson, M
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent. the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded. sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less...
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作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Casella, A
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and alt...
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作者：Goyal, S; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Essex; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pairwise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network f...
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作者：Fréchette, GR; Kagel, JH; Morelli, M
作者单位：New York University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson's Law. We also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non-cooperative bargaining models. Namely, p...
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作者：Meirowitz, A
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the ...
