-
作者：Knutson, B; Peterson, R
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：While the concept of expected utility informs many theories of decision making, little is known about whether and how the human brain might compute this quantity. This article reviews a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) experiments designed to localize brain regions that respond in anticipation of increasing amounts of monetary incentives. These studies collectively suggest that anticipation of increasing monetary gains activates a subcortical region of the ventral striatu...
-
作者：Okada, A; Riedl, A
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper experimentally investigates the impact of reciprocal behavior in multilateral bargaining and coalition formation. Our results show that reciprocal fairness strongly affects the efficiency and equity of coalition formation. In a large majority of cases, inefficient and unfair coalitions are chosen when their coalition values are relatively high. Up to one third of the experimental population is excluded from bargaining and earns nothing. In monetary terms economically significant eff...
-
作者：Battaglini, M
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34-55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the proper-ties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbi...
-
作者：Stinchcombe, MB
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Infinite normal form games that are mathematically simple have been treated [ Harris, C.J., Stinch-combe, M.B., Zame, W.R., in press. Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. Games Econ. Behav.]. Under study in this paper are the other infinite normal form games, a class that includes the normal forms of most extensive form games with infinite choice sets. Finitistic equilibria are the limits of approximate equilibria taken along generalized...
-
作者：Chun, Y; Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the behavior of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims when there is a large number of claimants with small claims. We model such situations by replicating some basic problem. We show that under replication, the random arrival rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behave's like the proportional rule. the rule that is the most often recommended in this context. Also. under replication, the minimal overlap rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behaves like the constrained equal lo...
-
作者：Ju, BG
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and a finite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preference. When aggregate certainty holds, we show that fixed price selections from Walrasian correspondence are the only rules satisfy...
-
作者：Goeree, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria nor do they alter the predictions of adjustment theories based on imitation or best response dynamics. As expected, however, increasing the effort cost lowers effort levels. Maximization of a stochastic potential function, a concept that generalizes risk dominance to continuous games, predicts this...
-
作者：Harris, CJ; Stinchcombe, MB; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games, with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, and all their finitely additive equilibria are equivalent to countably additive equilibria on metric...
-
作者：Rustichini, A; Dickhaut, J; Ghirardato, P; Smith, K; Pardo, JV
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Kansas State University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; US Department of Veterans Affairs; Veterans Health Administration (VHA); Minneapolis VA Health Care System
摘要：We study the behavior of subjects facing choices between certain, risky, and ambiguous lotteries. Subjects' choices are consistent with the economic theories modeling ambiguity aversion. Our results support the conjecture that subjects face choice tasks as an estimation of the value of the lotteries, and that the difficulty of the choice is an important explanatory variable (in addition to risk and ambiguity aversion). The brain imaging data suggest that such estimation is of an approximate na...
-
作者：Samet, D
