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作者：Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games-FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games-GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)-strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members-in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single Source and sink FCG's and GCG's. ...
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作者：d'Aspremont, Claude; Ferreira, Rodolphe Dos Santos
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：For an industry producing a single homogeneous good, we define and characterize the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. This parameterization will appear to be equivalent to the one used in the empirical literature. The Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The concept offers an alternative to the conjectural variati...
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作者：Herves-Beloso, Carlos; Moreno-Garcia, Emma
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; University of Salamanca
摘要：We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from the wider range of allocations that are feasible in the sense of Aubin. The set of Nash equilibria of our game is non-empty and our main result provi...
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作者：Penn, Michal; Polukarov, Maria; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southampton; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
摘要：We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task, We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we p...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：This paper explores how the ability to commit in games affect equilibrium payoffs. More precisely, we consider two-stage games, called commitment gaines, in which players can commit to some of their strategies in the first stage, and play the game induced by their commitment in the second stage. We completely characterize equilibrium payoffs of commitment games. Among others, we show that the power to commit in finitely repeated games as, for instance, finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game...
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作者：Ashworth, Scott; de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno
作者单位：University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization-the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election Outcome. Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition. Moreover, exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polari...
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作者：Dubey, Pradeep; Sondermann, Dieter
作者单位：University of Bonn; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University
摘要：We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walrus) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Mattozzi, Andrea
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Tulane University
摘要：We analyze the Coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuatio...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence E.; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; Tardos, Eva
作者单位：Cornell University; The Santa Fe Institute; Cornell University
摘要：In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations. Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries, and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market. We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders...
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作者：Guo, Mingyu; Conitzer, Vincent
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：For allocation problems with one or more items, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (aka Clarke mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction) is efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, it is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents' payments Will SLIM to more than 0. We study mechanisms that redistribute some of the VCG payments back to the agents, while maintaining the desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Our objec...
