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作者：Nowik, Irit
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We offer a new game-theoretical approach to analyze the developmental competition between inotoneurons (motor-neurons) that innervate the same muscle. The size principle-stating that motoneurons with successively higher activation thresholds innervate successively larger portions of muscle-is thought to result from this competition. However, it was not known how. We define a game in which motoneurons compete to innervate a maximal number of muscle-fibers. Their strategies are their activity le...
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作者：Grosskopf, Brit; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Rights of first refusal are contract clauses intended to provide the holder of a license or lease with some protection when the contract ends. The simplest version gives the right holder the ability to act after potential competitors. However, another common implementation requires the right holder to accept or reject some offers before potential competitors are given the same offer, and, if the right holder rejects the initial offer, allows the right to be exercised affirmatively only if comp...
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作者：Morgan, John; Orzen, Henrik; Sefton, Martin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general classes of network change properties that we term the least congestible route and size principles, respectively. We find that technical improvements to networks induce adjustments in traffic flows. In the cas...
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作者：Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A topology is efficient for network games if, for any game over it, every Nash equilibrium is socially optimal. It is well known that many topologies are not efficient for network games. We characterize efficient topologies in network games with a finite set of players, each wishing to transmit an atomic unit of unsplittable flow. We distinguish between two classes of atomic network routing games. In network congestion games a player's cost is the sum of the costs of the edges it traverses, wh...
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作者：Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Maastricht University; University of Cologne; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the associated prisoner's dilemma. Choosing into the group with the smaller defector-gain can signal one's willingness to cooperate. We find that viscosity produces an endogenous sorting of cooperators and defect...
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作者：Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Free University of Berlin
摘要：We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other pl...
