-
作者：Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce efficient descending auctions for two environments: multiple nonidentical items and buyers with unit-demand valuations; and multiple identical items and buyers with non-increasing marginal values. Our auctions are designed using the notion of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices and they terminate...
-
作者：Araujo, Aloisio; de Castro, Luciano I.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present ...
-
作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Harvard University; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
摘要：A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players call play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Te...
-
作者：Sharma, Yogeshwer; Williamson, David P.
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：It is well known that the Nash equilibrium in network routing games can have strictly higher cost than the optimum cost. In Stackelberg routing games, where a fraction of flow is centrally-controlled, a natural problem is to route the centrally-controlled flow such that the overall cost of the resulting equilibrium is minimized. We consider the scenario where the network administrator wants to know the minimum amount of centrally-controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium ...
-
作者：Amir, Rabah; Bloch, Francis
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Arizona; University of Warwick
摘要：This paper investigates the effects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, Sufficient conditions for different comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one good is Sufficient for the equilibrium price to be increasing in the number of buyers, normality of both goods is required for equilibrium bids and sellers' equilibrium utilities to be increasing in the number of buyers. When the ...
-
作者：Guardiola, Luis A.; Meca, Ana; Puerto, Justo
作者单位：University of Sevilla; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit production, inventory-holding and backlogging cost. Cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities: agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost. We prove that t...
-
作者：Csoka, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Koczy, Laszlo A.
作者单位：Maastricht University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：The measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management. Coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem. In an environment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios' realization vectors, risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversification benefits of the various portfolios? Understanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable, efficient, and fair allocatio...
-
作者：Gorodeisky, Ziv
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, which behave, in expectation, like the best-response dynamics (i.e., the continuous fictitious play). Since the corresponding vector field is not continuous, we cannot apply the deterministic approximation results of Benaim and Weibull [M. Benaim, W. Weibull. 2003. Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games. Econometrica 71, 873-903]. Nevertheless, we prove such results for our dynamics by developing the notion of...
-
作者：Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); McGill University
摘要：We consider a finite two-player zero-stun game with vector-valued rewards. We study the question of whether a given polyhedral set D is approachable, that is, whether Player 1 (the decision maker) can guarantee that the long-term average reward belongs to D, for any strategy of Player 2 (the adversary). We examine Blackwell's necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability, and show that the problem of checking these conditions is NP-hard, even in the special case where D is a singleto...
-
作者：Stamatopoulos, Giorgos; Tauman, Tami
作者单位：University of Crete; Columbia University
摘要：It is well known that selling licenses for the use of a cost-reducing innovation by auction yields a higher revenue compared to fixed fee in a symmetric Cournot industry. In this note we show that this result can be reversed in an asymmetric Cournot industry, i.e., the fixed fee policy can generate a strictly higher revenue than the auction policy in an industry where prior to the innovation firms are cost-asymmetric. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
