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作者：Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests. When contestants are homogeneous, under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests. When no restrictions are placed on the contest technology, the results further demonstrate an increasing-return-to-scale property such that each individual responds to a pro...
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作者：Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large, then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient. Increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participation. Finally, we argue that the effects underlying our results are robust in a large class of endogen...
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作者：Grilo, Isabel; Mertens, Jean-Francois
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite de Lille
摘要：In a multi-commodity framework with absence of wealth effects, we prove the existence of equilibrium for Cournot oligopoly, and that the concept is completely non-ambiguous. We also obtain a uniquely defined endogenous inverse demand function, depending only on the competitive sector. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Botelho, Anabela; Harrison, Glenn W.; Costa Pinto, Ligia M.; Rutstrom, Elisabet E.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Universidade do Minho
摘要：Game theory Provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters Usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a random strangers design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so sm...
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作者：Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Waterloo
摘要：We consider the makespan-minimization problem Oil unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), where the processing time of a job on each machine is either low or high. We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm (in a black-box fashion) to a 3c-approximation truthful-...
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作者：Mehta, Aranyak; Roughgarden, Tim; Sundararajan, Mukund
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：The only known general technique for designing truthful and approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms with good efficiency or computational complexity properties is due to Moulin [1999. Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness. Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (2), 279-320]. For many fundamental cost-sharing applications, however, Moulin mechanisms provably suffer from poor budget-balance, poor economic efficiency, or both. We propose acyclic mechanisms, a n...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Aumann, Robert J.; Peck, James; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Arizona
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Brown University; University of London; University College London
摘要：When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game's outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents' ability to realize gains from such speculative bets when their priors are private information? We apply a mechanism design approach to this question. We characterize interim-efficient bets and discuss their implementability in terms of the un...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Kleinberg, Robert; Papadimitriou, Christos H.
作者单位：Microsoft; Cornell University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the windfall of malice: paradoxically...
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作者：Page, Frank H., Jr.; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Warwick
摘要：We introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. Rules may range from noncooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates player preferences, the rules of network formation, and the degree of farsightedness of players. A speci...
