Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Robert M.; Ellison, Glenn; Fudenberg, Drew
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.009
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2-23
• 关键词: agglomeration; Two-sided markets; Quasi-equilibrium; Tipping; Large finite economies; integer constraints; indivisibility; Nonstandard analysis

摘要

Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called buyers and sellers: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that two markets of very different sizes can co-exist even if larger markets are more efficient. This extends the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg [2003. Quart. J. Econ. 118, 1249-1278], who ignored the constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market should be an integer, and instead analyzed the quasi-equilibria where agents are treated as infinitely divisible. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.