Ability and knowledge

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gossner, Olivier
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.011
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 95-106
• 关键词: Bayesian games; asymmetric information; value of information

摘要

In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G' such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G' than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G' such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More ability can then be rationalized by more knowledge, and our result thus establishes the formal equivalence between ability and knowledge. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.