Bargaining with a property rights owner

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tauman, Yair; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• 署名单位: Kyiv School of Economics; Kyiv Economics Institute (KEI); State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 132-145
• 关键词: Cooperative solution; Nucleolus; Patent licensing; intellectual property

摘要

We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are the same across all agents and all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. The symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.