Only a dictatorship is efficient
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Kornhauser, Lewis A.
署名单位：
University of London; London Business School; New York University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.010
发表日期：
2010
页码：
261-270
关键词：
摘要：
In many, if not most, elections, several different seats must be filled, so that a group of candidates, or an assembly, is selected. Typically in these elections, voters cast their ballots on a seat-by-seat basis. We show that these seat-by-seat procedures are efficient only under extreme conditions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.