A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham; Delhi School of Economics; University of Delhi; Brown University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 189-193
• 关键词: Correlated equilibrium distribution; implementation; MONOTONICITY

摘要

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium. Thus, no mechanism that aims to understand a correlated distribution as the unique outcome of Nash equilibrium play can be found. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.