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作者：Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of payment are considered: (i) charging the winning buyer a one-time payment: (ii) charging an initial payment followed by a profit sharing contract (PSC) that divides the realized profit between the seller and the winning buyer. A symmetric interdependent values model with a risk neutral seller and either risk averse or risk neutral buyers is considered, along with the second pric...
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作者：Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage-effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage-effort relationship. We compare the standard bilateral gift-exchange game between an owner-manager and a worker with two trilateral ones where the firm is owned by a shareholder and controlled by a manager. The wage-effort relationship is simi...
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作者：Meng, Dawen; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We first show that unobservable risk aversion or cost leads to low-powered incentives. We then consider the case where both risk aversion and cost of the agent are unobservable to the principal. This multidimensional mechanism design problem is solved under two assumptions with regard to the structures...
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作者：Faillo, Marco; Grieco, Daniela; Zarri, Luca
作者单位：University of Trento; University of Verona
摘要：In dealing with peer punishment as a cooperation enforcement device, laboratory studies have typically concentrated on discretionary sanctioning, allowing players to castigate each other arbitrarily. By contrast, in real life punishments are often meted out only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this 'legitimate punishment' institution and show that it yields substantial benefits to cooperation and efficiency g...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the ...
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作者：Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：We study the implementation problem when players are prone to make mistakes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophistication level of players approaches infinity. We show that quasimonotonicity, a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, and no worst alternative are the necessary conditions for restricted Limit LQRE (LLQRE) implementation. Moreover, these conditions are suff...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Open University Israel; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized No-speculative-trade theorem according to which there cannot be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of...
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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kaplan, Todd R.
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Haifa
摘要：Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs. In this paper, we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by givin...
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作者：Xiao, Erte
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Punishment typically involves depriving violators of resources they own such as money or labor. These resources can become revenue for authorities and thus motivate profit-seeking punishment. In this paper, we design a novel experiment to provide direct evidence on the role punishment plays in communicating norms. Importantly, this allows us to provide experimental evidence indicating that if people know that enforcers can benefit monetarily by punishing, they no longer view punishment as sign...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just for computing the outcome of a certain social-choice function, an additional amount of communication may be required for computing the equilibrium-supporting payments (if exist). Our main result shows t...
