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作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizabilit...
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作者：Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Max Planck Society
摘要：The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former 'brothers in arms' fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the abili...
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作者：Dogan, Gonul; van Assen, Marcel; Potters, Jan
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We examine experimentally how link costs affect the formation of links between a single seller and two potential buyers as well as the ensuing bargaining. Theory predicts that link costs lead to less competitive networks, with one link rather than two links, and that link costs do not affect the bargaining outcomes conditional on the network. We find support for the first but not the second prediction. 2-link networks form less frequently when there are link costs. Given that a 2-link network ...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：A monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types. The seller coordinates the buyers' adoption decisions based on their reported types, and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions. We study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion-proof, and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme, more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions, and the number of adoptions is maximized su...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Southampton
摘要：We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players' strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type sp...
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作者：Chen, Yiling; Lai, John K.; Parkes, David C.; Procaccia, Ariel D.
作者单位：Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic issues, but these papers focus on fairness and consider a strikingly weak notion of truthfulness. In this paper we investigate the problem of cutting a cake in a way that is truthful, Pareto-efficient, and fair, where for the first time our n...
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作者：Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; Columbia University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no positive contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contrib...
