Cournot games with biconcave demand

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ewerhart, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 37-47
• 关键词: Cournot games; Existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy; Nash equilibrium; Generalized concavity; supermodularity

摘要

Biconcavity is a simple condition on inverse demand that corresponds to the ordinary concept of concavity after simultaneous parameterized transformations of price and quantity. The notion is employed here in the framework of the homogeneous-good Cournot model with potentially heterogeneous firms. The analysis leads to unified conditions, respectively, for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium via nonincreasing best-response selections, for existence via quasiconcavity, and for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The usefulness of the generalizations is illustrated in cases where inverse demand is either nearly linear or isoelastic. It is also shown that commonly made assumptions regarding large outputs are often redundant. (C) 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).