On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoerner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Yale University; National University of Singapore; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.010
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 70-83
• 关键词: Stochastic games; repeated games; folk theorem

摘要

This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Homer et al. (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, it is shown that this limit set of payoffs is a convex polytope when attention is restricted to perfect public equilibria in pure strategies. This result fails for mixed strategies, even when attention is restricted to two-player repeated games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.