Dynamic expert incentives in teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Lily Ling
• 署名单位: University of Basel; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 27-47
• 关键词: information acquisition; persuasion; voluntary disclosure; Bayesian learning; free-riding

摘要

We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery to a decision maker. We show that dynamic revelation of information causes the experts' incentives to acquire information to evolve over time. This leads to novel collaboration dynamics and, in particular, the introduction of another expert can have a motivating effect on the existing expert in spite of the incentive to free ride. We further set up the planner's problem and discuss when the (constrained) social optimum can be achieved. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.