Position auctions with multi-unit demands

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yan, Haomin
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.002
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 179-193
• 关键词: position auctions; Multi-unit demands; Ascending clock auctions; VCG

摘要

This paper studies the design of position auctions when bidders have multi-unit demands for advertising positions. I propose an ascending clock auction with two stages: allocation stage and assignment stage. The allocation stage determines the quantity of positions assigned to each advertiser using a generalized version of the Ausubel (2004) auction under the context of differentiated items. The assignment stage determines the ranking of advertisements using a generalized version of the generalized English auction under the context of multi-unit demands. I show that this two-stage ascending clock auction dynamically implements the VCG outcome in an ex post perfect equilibrium under pure private values. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.