On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Della Lena, Sebastiano; Manzoni, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio
• 署名单位: Monash University; University of Bergamo; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.012
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 765-793
• 关键词: Trust and trustworthiness; Guilt aversion; cultural transmission; Psychological games

摘要

This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.