Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meyer, Jacob; Rentschler, Lucas
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.013
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 381-410
• 关键词: Mandatory voting; information acquisition; Costly voting

摘要

We develop and experimentally test a model of voter information acquisition in nonpartisan elections, both with and without abstention. We theoretically demonstrate that allowing for abstention can increase information acquisition, provided the cost of information is not too low. Our experimental data find that voters are less responsive than predicted to increases in the cost of information. As a result, the cost required to yield higher levels of informedness when abstention is allowed is higher than predicted. Our data are well explained by agent quantal response equilibrium, which accounts for the fact that uninformed voters are often observed to vote, even when it is not rational to do so. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.