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作者：Abe, Takaaki; Nakada, Satoshi
作者单位：Kyushu University; Tokyo University of Science
摘要：This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules, which is referred to as the in-group egalitarian Owen values, that integrates two seemingly conflicting principles-marginalism and egalitarianism-in the framework of cooperative games with coalition structures. This class of allocation rules facilitates the use of different principles of allocation in different layers of a social structure such as allocation across coalitions and within a coalition. Therefore, each coalition can employ its s...
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作者：Ortega, Josue; Klein, Thilo
作者单位：Queens University Belfast; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the rank-minimizing mechanism (RM). While one would expect that RM improves upon both DA and TTC in terms of rank efficiency, the size of the improvement is nonetheless surprising. Moreover, while it is not explicitly designed to do so, RM also significantly improve...
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作者：Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner
作者单位：Sami Shamoon College of Engineering; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information with n contestants who have non-linear cost functions. The designer may award two kinds of subsidy (taxation): one that decreases (increases) each contestant's marginal cost of effort and another that increases (decreases) each contestant's value of winning. The designer's expected payoff is the contestants' expected total effort minus the cost of subsidy or, alternatively, plus the tax payment. We show that when the resource of subsidy (t...
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作者：van Beek, Andries; Malmberg, Benjamin; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke; Schouten, Jop
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We analyze applications of biform games to linear production (LP) and sequencing processes. Biform games apply to problems in which strategic decisions are followed by some cooperative game, where the specific environment of the cooperative game is in turn determined by these strategic decisions. In biform LP-processes, we allow firms to compete for resources, rather than assuming the resource bundles are simply given. With strategy dependent resource bundles that can be obtained from two loca...
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作者：Macault, Emilien; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：Theorem 6 in Macault et al. (2022) is incorrect. The problem is related to an incorrect application of Lemma 13. We provide a correct version of the lemma and the theorem. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Leshem, Shmuel; Tabbach, Avraham
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper offers an option value-based rationale for the consideration of non-compliance record in punishment. We study compliance decisions of a population of individuals who live for two periods, where each individual's non-compliance benefits are random and independent over time. Because non-uniform sanction schemes produce different option values to current-period compliance and non-compliance, an optimal sanction scheme trades off present and future compliance and depends on the overall ...
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作者：Sun, Xiang; Xu, Jin; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Wuhan University; Wuhan University; Shandong University; Tsinghua University
摘要：In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the a...
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作者：Lu, Feifei; Shi, Fei
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We study a coevolutionary model of network formation in minimum-effort games. Agents dynamically choose both their effort levels and their interaction partners, but face heterogeneous constraints on how many partners they can interact with. The dynamics under heterogeneity behaves very differently from the one in the homogeneous case, with gradual transitions spreading across the population stepwise instead of sudden adoptions. The long-run outcomes depend crucially on the distribution of inte...
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作者：Dugar, Subhasish; Shahriar, Quazi
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：To what extent do pivotal nonpartisan voters believe and act upon potentially deceptive messages from partisans who privately observe candidates' ex-ante fitness-for-office attributes? How do nonpartisan voters' responses to messages vary with changing odds of candidates' fitness-for-office attributes? This paper derives contrasting predictions regarding pivotal nonpartisans' reactions to potential lies across two-candidate voting competitions and tests them in the laboratory. We find that the...
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作者：Kandul, Serhiy; Lanz, Bruno; Reins, Evert
作者单位：University of Zurich; Kyiv School of Economics; University of Neuchatel; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of reciprocity in markets where expert-sellers have more information about the severity of a problem faced by a consumer. We employ a standard experimental credence goods market to introduce the possibility for consumers to gift the expert-seller before the diagnostic, where the gift is either transferred unconditionally or conditionally on solving the problem. We find that both types of gifts increase the frequency of consumer-friendly actions relative to no gift, but only c...
