Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deligkas, Argyrios; Filos-Ratsikas, Aris; Voudouris, Alexandros A.
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Edinburgh; University of Essex
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.001
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 200-215
• 关键词: Facility location; Heterogeneous preferences; voting

摘要

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0, 1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three different settings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each setting, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results. (c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by-nc -nd /4 .0/).